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Abstract
Quantum Key Distribution is a secret distribution technique that requires an authen-
ticated channel. This channel is usually created on top of an un-authenticated communi-
cation medium using unconditionally secure Message Authentication Codes (MAC) and
an initial common secret. We examine the consequences of replacing this MAC algorithm
by a cryptographic hash-based signature algorithm, like the Lamport algorithm. We
show that provided one-way functions exist, the Lamport algorithm or its variants can
be instantiated in a secure way in the Universally Composable sense, and can therefore
be plugged into any QKD protocol with a composable security proof in a secure manner.
This association, while relying on short-term computational hardness assumptions, results
in an increase of the practical security of QKD and eases its deployment.
1 QKD, session authentication, and Digital Signatures
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a way to create shared and secret random values at both
ends of a communication link, with a security guaranteed without computational hardness as-
sumptions [SBpC+09]. It requires however a classical authenticated channel, together with
an untrusted ’quantum’ channel (usually realized with an optical fiber or a free space opti-
cal transmission). This authenticated channel can be realized on top of an un-authenticated
network connection using cryptographic primitives. The natural choice for these primitives is
to use symmetric, unconditionally secure Message Authentication Codes like Wegman-Carter
[WC81], Evaluation Hash [MV84] or LFSR-based Toeplitz [Kra94]. Being symmetric, these
primitives require a common secret; this is not a problem as soon as enough secret is created
by the QKD link, but it is an undesirable constraint for the first run, as it forces the user to
dispatch securely a common secret at both ends of the link. A very common argument against
QKD is that, instead of exchanging a short common secret and using QKD to amplify it, one
may as well exchange initially a very large secret and use it in place of the QKD output; the
latter solution is easily realized thanks to the very low current price of storage. While this
argument is not entirely correct,1 it is desirable to have alternatives to the pre-sharing of a
common secret.
1Indeed, QKD is forward secure, which means that each key produced is completely independent of past
values; as a consequence, even an attacker having at some point in time a complete knowledge of the equipment
state including its secrets, does not learn anything about future keys in a passive attack scenario. Contrary to
the hard disk scenario where a one-time compromise is enough to obtain all the keys, QKD forces the attacker
to perform a persistent active attack in order to obtain new keys, with a much higher risk of being detected.
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Another argument against methods based on a common secret is that they are very hard
to operate securely in practice. Indeed, the right way to implement them would be to store
the secret on a device providing hardware security like a smart card (acting as a safe for the
secret), but for this to be of interest the whole authentication tag computation needs to be
performed inside the secure device. Unfortunately, the complete computation by a smart card
of an authentication tag for a large set of messages corresponding to a QKD protocol run,
typically consisting of several megabits, is unpractical. The secret must therefore be allowed
to go out of the secure device; but then the very purpose of the secure device is defeated2.
Mitigation measures include enabling the secret to go out of the secure device only in a
trusted environment, with a mechanism to authenticate the latter to the secure device like a
pin code, or splitting the secret into several parts handled by independent parties, but the
overall security assurance provided by these techniques does not compare favorably to the one
offered by the resistance of cryptographic primitives, even computationally secure.
Asymmetric cryptographic primitives which are used to negotiate keys in classical cryptogra-
phy protocols usually employ computationally secure authentication means that are themselves
asymmetric, that is, digital signature algorithms. A common combination (normalized as ISO
9798-3 [ISO98]) is to use the Signed Diffie-Hellman algorithm, where a Diffie-Hellman key ex-
change is authenticated with digital signatures. The QKD protocol and the Diffie-Hellman
algorithm are very similar in function, in that they both enable to create common secret values
if a way to authenticate messages is available, although the security guarantees they provide
differ. Digital signatures require the communicating parties to exchange public keys in an au-
thentic way, contrary to symmetric MAC algorithms which require a common secret value.
This is a huge improvement because it is much easier to ensure that a value is authentic than
it is to guarantee its secrecy3. This is because a message alteration can be uncovered anytime
after it occurred, whereas preventing a loss of secrecy requires the perfect continuity of the
protecting measures. Together with the invention of Public Key Infrastructures, this is what
sparkled the success of public-key cryptography.
Similarly to the case of Diffie-Hellman, it is appealing to use an asymmetric signature
algorithm to authenticate the first run of a pair of QKD equipments. Of course, doing this
makes the QKD security depend on the strength of the signing algorithm, which reintroduces
the very computational hardness assumptions QKD is supposed to be free of.
In realistic deployments however, QKD will not be used stand-alone, encrypting traffic using
one-time pad, and ensuring its integrity using unconditionally secure Message Authentication
Codes, but rather together with computationally secure symmetric encryption and authen-
tication algorithms built on top of symmetric ciphers like the AES [FIP01]; in that setting,
hardness assumptions are required to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the user traffic,
and therefore it makes sense to investigate the relationship between these assumptions and the
ones backing the security of asymmetric signature algorithms.
The existence of practical secure symmetric cryptography (stream ciphers, block ciphers,
and hash functions) is equivalent to the existence of one-way functions, that is, functions easy
to compute and hard to invert. Indeed, block ciphers are pseudorandom permutations, i.e.
permutations indexed by a key which are computationally indistinguishable from random per-
2One could think of a 2-stage scheme where the secure device authenticates a small digest of the message,
but this can only be made secure in the computational sense: it must not be possible to find collisions for the
function that transforms the message into the digest, and such collisions exist since the digest is smaller than
the message.
3When there are more than two users, the separation of the key in a public and a private part also reduces
the number of keys to distribute, since the same private-public key pair can be used to authenticate to several
parties, the public part being distributed to all of them. In the point-to-point setting of QKD however, we are
not concerned by this property.
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mutations when the key is secret; stream ciphers are pseudorandom number generators; and
hash functions are collision, 1st- and 2nd-preimage resistant functions4. One-way functions exis-
tence is known to be equivalent to the existence of pseudo-random number generators [HILL93],
to the existence of pseudorandom functions [GGM86] and to the existence of pseudorandom per-
mutations [LR88]. One-wayness is exactly 1st-preimage resistance; it is implied by 2nd-preimage
resistance which is in turn implied by collision resistance; see [RS04]. Conversely, a collision
resistant, length-reducing function can be constructed from a one-way function [Rom90]. Hence
2nd-preimage resistant or collision resistant functions exist iff one-way functions exist.
It is expected that one-way functions do exist, although this conjecture, implying the famous
conjecture P 6= NP , is not likely to be proven in the near future5. The existence of one-
way functions with a trapdoor, which are required to instantiate most asymmetric primitives,
implies the existence of one-way functions, but there is no known converse result. Assuming
the existence of quantum computers, the security of the most well-known number-theory-based
constructions used in asymmetric cryptography (RSA, discrete logarithm-based) collapse. On
the contrary, one-way functions do not seem particularly threatened. The Grover quantum
algorithm enabling exhaustive search with square root complexity [Gro96] requires a key space of
size 22n to ensure an exhaustive key search in O (2n), as opposed to 2n with classical computers,
but this linear key length increase is manageable.
Of course, the situation with practical algorithms is more complex, since even if one-
way functions and secure, logarithmic key size symmetric cryptography exist, it is not known
whether the symmetric primitives used today are good approximations of their idealized coun-
terparts. Symmetric ciphers and cryptographic hash functions like the SHA family [FIP08] do
not seem to rely on a small family of well-identified hypotheses of hardness of simple mathe-
matical problems, unlike asymmetric algorithms6. This lack of structure has two consequences:
there is no provable security reduction between symmetric algorithms, but conversely their se-
curity is not likely to collapse because of some sudden theoretical advance. The last 30 years
of cryptanalytic progress showed that the security of symmetric primitives of early designs like
DES [FIP99] or hashing functions like SHA1 tend to erode slowly rather than abruptly, and
that more mature designs (the AES competition contenders, the SHA2 family) exhibit a very
good resistance to cryptanalysis.
A family of signature algorithms, Lamport signatures [Lam79] and their derivatives, only
require a function f with 1st-preimage resistance (i.e. a one-way function) and a function with
collision resistance g to work. 7.
The combination of QKD with public channel authentication performed with a secure in-
stantiation of Lamport signatures is expected to have the same security properties as QKD com-
bined with unconditional authentication methods. We propose to prove rigorously the security
of this combination in the Universal Composability (UC) framework described in [Can01], with
the definitions of [Can03] concerning the UC security of signatures. Indeed, Universal Compos-
ability is the right framework to securely assemble cryptographic primitives, either classical or
quantum [Unr04]. To sum up the previous discussion, the association of one-way-function-based
signatures, and Lamport signatures in particular, with QKD is desirable in practice compared
to the use of one-way-trapdoor-based signature schemes because:
4a function is nth-preimage resistant if it is difficult to compute a nth preimage of a value x given n − 1
different preimages of x.
5for a general presentation of these issues, see chapter 9 of [MvOV96], and in particular remark 9.12
6For instance, the RSA hypothesis - related to, and not stronger than factoring - for RSA [RSA78], the
discrete logarithm in finite fields or elliptic curves for DSA/ECDSA [FIP09, JM99] and Schnorr Signatures
[Sch90], or related problems like the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem, etc.
7Since a length-reducing, collision resistant function can be built from a one-way function, such schemes
show that the existence of one-way functions implies the existence of digital signatures [Rom90]
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• there is greater confidence in the security of one-way functions and collision-resistant
functions used today than in one-way trapdoor constructions;
• the computational hardness assumptions that are needed regarding one-way functions
and collision-resistant functions are close to the ones needed to ensure the security of the
mechanisms using the keys produced by QKD in most realistic scenarios; this is not the
case for one-way-trapdoor security.
Whatever the computationally secure primitive used to ensure authentication, the hardness
assumptions related to that primitive must only hold during the run time of a QKD session for
the QKD protocol to remain forward-secure: no long-term hardness hypothesis is needed.
Finally this association is easier to deploy than QKD paired with an unconditional authen-
tication scheme because the latter requires to deploy a common secret, a procedure which is
difficult to implement properly.
In the rest of this paper, we investigate in details this solution, examine some of its variants
and detail the security properties obtained.
Related work : a more general survey of the relationship between various existence as-
sumptions of classical cryptographic primitives including QKD is laid out in [IM11]. Classical
authenticated key exchange security models adapted to the QKD case are studied in [MSU12].
Our contribution is to rigorously prove in the UC framework the security of the association
of computationally secure signatures, and Lamport signatures in particular, with QKD.
2 Lamport Signatures
2.1 Description
For this paragraph, the main reference is the chapter 3 of the book [BBD08]8.
(n, ℓ) Lamport signatures are n × ℓ-bit strings, where n and ℓ are chosen according to the
security requirements as explained in section 2.4.
As usual for digital signatures, a message to be signed is first transformed into a fixed-length
string, its digest, by a collision-resistant hash function g chosen randomly in a collision-resistant
function family G = {gk : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}ℓ|k ∈ K ′}. The rest of the algorithm uses f chosen
randomly in a one-way function family {fk : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}n|k ∈ K}.
In practice, f and g are often instatiated with a fixed cryptographic hash function, but
the security analysis of collision-resistant and one-way function requires considering function
families, for there exists trivial adversaries against the one-wayness or collision resistance of
any fixed function.
Key generation algorithm Values xi[j] ∈ {0, 1}
n, i = 0, . . . , ℓ − 1, j = 0, 1, are drawn
randomly with the uniform distribution and make the private signature key. The public key is
{yi[j] = f(xi[j]), i = 0, . . . , ℓ− 1, j = 0, 1}.
Signature algorithm The signature of a message M of digest m = g(M) = m0, . . . , mℓ−1
is the n× ℓ-bit string x0[m0], x1[m1], . . . , xn−1[mℓ−1].
Signature verification algorithm The signature verification of a signature s0, . . . , sℓ−1 of
a message M with digest m = g(M) = m0, . . . , mℓ−1 outputs True if ∀ i = 0, . . . , ℓ−1, f(si) =
yi[mi], and False otherwise.
8available on-line at
http://www.cdc.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/~dahmen/papers/hashbasedcrypto.pdf
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2.2 The Case of QKD; one-time Signatures Usability
The Lamport algorithm is not widely used because a key pair can only sign one message.
Indeed, its security degrades very quickly when several messages are signed with the same key
pair: this is to be expected since a signature is really just a part of the private key. More
precisely, given k signatures of messages whose digests are mji , i = 0, . . . , ℓ−1, j = 0, . . . , k−1,
a signature for any message of digest m′0, . . . , m
′
ℓ−1 s.t.
∀ i , m′i ∈ {m
j
i |j = 0, . . . , k − 1} (1)
can be signed using the previous signatures. As soon as the signed messages digests differ on
more that one bit (which occurs with overwhelming probability as soon as k ≥ 2 since ℓ≫ 1),
new combinations of the differing bits can be used to create digests that can be signed with
the publicly available data and that are different from the original message digests9.
As we shall see in section 3.2, there are hash-based signature algorithms that are able to
sign several messages with a unique set of keys. However, in the QKD setting, the limitation
to one signature is not an issue for two reasons:
• The algorithm is only used to authenticate the first protocol run of a pair of QKD devices;
subsequent executions are authenticated normally with a symmetric MAC algorithm using
some of the common secret produced by the QKD link itself.
• To enable a recovery when this run was not successful, it is possible to include in the
signed message a new public key that will be used to authenticate a new execution if
needed. Additionally, a computational symmetric MAC can be used to check for message
authenticity before using the Lamport mechanism: this will eliminate most failures before
resorting to the signature and consuming the Lamport key, while not needing to put too
much trust in the symmetric key used by the computational MAC mechanism.
2.3 UC Security of Lamport Signatures
In this section we prove the UC security of the Lamport signature algorithm, from the more
classical security notion of existential unforgeability under chosen-message attack (EU-CMA)
[GMR88, Can03], which models the ability for an adversary of a signature scheme to produce
a forged signature for a message of her choice after interacting with the signature algorithm,
and in particular after the observation of valid signatures of chosen messages. For the reader
convenience, an informal definition of EU-CMA security is stated below.
Definition 2.1 (EU-CMA security). A EU-CMA adversary against a signature scheme (defined
by its key generation, signature, and signature verification algorithms) is a randomized algorithm
interacting
• with a key generation oracle which outputs identities-public key pairs,
• with a signature oracle which outputs valid signatures given on input a message to sign
and one of the identities created with the key generation oracle,
• with a corruption oracle which outputs the private key and the internal state of the signing
algorithm when given on input one of the identities created with the key generation oracle.
9for values of k ≪ n, it may still be hard to find a message whose digest lies in the set of digests that can be
signed using the revealed part of the private key, i.e. messages satisfying equation (1), but this property holds
only for very small values of k and cannot be used in practice.
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A signature scheme is (t, ǫ) EU-CMA secure if no EU-CMA adversary can produce with
a probability ≥ ǫ and time ≤ t a valid message-signature pair (M,σ) for a message M never
submitted to the signature oracle and for an uncorrupted identity.
Definition 2.2 (EU-CMA security, bounded queries). A signature scheme is (t, ǫ, k) EU-CMA
secure if (t, ǫ) EU-CMA secure against adversaries that are restricted to performing at most k
signature queries for each identity. It is said to be (t, ǫ, k, r) secure if it is (t, ǫ, k) EU-CMA
secure against adversaries restricted to perform at most r key generation queries.
It was seen that (t, ǫ, k) EU-CMA security of Lamport signatures breaks down if k > 1. We
prove conversely that it is (t, ǫ, 1) EU-CMA secure when correctly instantiated.
Definition 2.3 (one-way function family). A family of functions F = {fk : {0, 1}
n →
{0, 1}n|k ∈ K} for some n ∈ N, some finite set K is (t, ǫ) one-way if the probability for
any randomized algorithm given on input a random k ∈ K and y ∈ fk({0, 1}
n) to output in
time ≤ t x s.t. fk(x) = y is below ǫ.
Definition 2.4 (collision-resistant function family). A family of functions G = {gk : {0, 1}
∗ →
{0, 1}ℓ|k ∈ K} for some ℓ ∈ N, some finite set K is (tCR, ǫCR) collision-resistant if the proba-
bility for any randomized algorithm given on input a random k ∈ K to output in time ≤ tCR
x, x′ s.t. gk(x) = gk(x
′) is below ǫCR.
The EU-CMA security proof below is similar for instance to the proof found in [GB01] of
a simplified Lamport signature scheme. There, a slightly weaker EF-CMA security model is
used, where the attacker must produce a valid signature for some fixed public key.
Theorem 2.1 (EU-CMA security of the full Lamport signature scheme). Let n, ℓ ∈ N, F =
{fk : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}n|k ∈ K} be a family of (t, ǫOW) one-way functions, and G = {gk :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}ℓ|k ∈ K ′} be a family of (t, ǫCR) collision-resistant functions. Then the (n, ℓ)
Lamport signature scheme L(F ,G) that uses F and G is (t, ǫL, 1) EU-CMA secure with the
additional restriction on attackers that they are allowed at most r queries to the key generation
oracle, for ǫL = r(2 ℓ ǫOW + ǫCR).
Proof. The proof proceeds by transforming an attacker A against the signature scheme into
an attacker against the underlying one-way function family or the collision-resistant function
family. Given a challenge (k, y) for the one-way function family F and a challenge k′ against
the collision-resistant function family G, the environment of the attacker is simulated as follows.
(k, k′) is given to the attacker. Some indexes r′, ℓ′, b with index 0 ≤ r′ < r, 0 ≤ ℓ′ < ℓ and
b ∈ {0, 1} are chosen randomly with the uniform distribution. As will be seen later r′ is a guess
on the identity attacked by A . The key generation and signature oracles are simulated as in
the Lamport definition with f = fk and g = gk′, except for the r
′-th key generation query (if
it is made by the attacker) where yℓ′[b] is set to y. No corresponding private key value xℓ′ [b] is
therefore known by the simulator.
If a signature query is made on identity r′, the simulator is able to answer it with probably
1/2; it aborts the simulation otherwise. If a corrupt query is issued on identity r′, the simulation
is also aborted. All other queries succeed with probability 1.
Assume the attacker succeeds and outputs a valid forgery (M1, σ) for identity r
′′. If r′′ 6= r′,
the simulation is aborted. Otherwise, three cases can occur.
• There was no signature query made on identity r′. In that case, with probability 1/2
g(M1)ℓ′ = b and σ contains a preimage of y.
• A signature query was made for some message M0 6= M1 and g(M0) 6= g(M1). In that
case, with probability 1/ℓ, g(M1)ℓ′ = b = 1− g(M0)ℓ′ and σ contains a preimage of y.
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• A signature query was made for some message M0 6= M1 and g(M0) = g(M1). Then
(M0,M1) is a collision pair for g.
In any of these three cases, if the simulator gets a collision on g or a preimage of y by f
it outputs it and stops the simulation. Let ǫpre′ the probability of the first two cases and ǫcoll
the probability of the last case. If r′ is the correct guess on the identity attacked by A, which
is the case with probability 1/r, no corrupt query happens on identity r′ before the forgery is
produced. Thus if ǫ is the success probability of A,
ǫpre′ + ǫcoll = ǫ/r.
The success probability ǫpre of the simulator against F satisfies ǫpre ≥ ǫpre′/2ℓ. The success
probability of the simulator against G is ǫcoll. Finally if the A runs in time t, the simulator also
runs in time t and
ǫ ≤ r(2ℓǫpre + ǫcoll) ≤ r(2ℓǫOW + ǫCR)
To prove the UC security of Lamport signatures, we use a non-asymptotic version of theorem
2 of [Can03], which ensures that it is equivalent to realise the ideal functionality of signature
FSIG (the UC definition of signature security), and to be EU-CMA secure. Both the EU-CMA
notion and the corresponding UC ideal function can be restricted to the k-signature setting,
where an adversary is only allowed to invoke the signing oracle k times per identity. Let us call
the UC restricted functionality FSIG k.
Theorem 2.2 (equivalence between EU-CMA security and UC security of signatures FSIG).
Assume that a signature scheme π is (t, ǫ) (resp. (t, ǫ, k), (t, ǫ, k, 1)) EU-CMA secure. Then
for any adversary A running in time t and performing at most r key generation queries, there
exists a simulator S such that the advantage ǫUC of any environment Z to distinguish whether
it is interacting with FSIG (resp. FSIG k, FSIG k) and S or with π and A satisfies ǫUC ≤ r ǫ.
We say that π is a (t, rǫ, r) realization of functionality FSIG (resp. FSIG k, FSIG k).
Proof. As theorem 2 of [Can03]. The argument for the bound on the distinguishing probability
comes from two observations:
• To enable the environment to distinguish the real and the ideal case with nonzero advan-
tage, the adversary must produce a valid forged signature during its execution, enabling
to construct an attacker G in the EU-CMA model from a pair (A,Z) distinguishing the
real and the ideal case;
• The attacker G above needs to guess in advance the identity corresponding to the forgery
produced. This guess succeeds with probability 1/r. This induces a loss factor r on the
reduction.
The number of signature queries made by A in the FSIG setting and by the forger G in
the EU-CMA setting are the same which ensures that (·, ·, k) EU-CMA secure schemes and
realizations of FSIG k functionality are in correspondence in this proof.
Furthermore, the forger G simulates internally all identities except the one it attempts to
forge a signature for. Therefore G performs only one key generation query on π in the EU-CMA
model no matter r.
We can now derive our main result regarding Lamport UC security.
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Corollary 2.1 (UC security of the Lamport signature scheme). Let n, ℓ ∈ N, F = {fk :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n|k ∈ K} be a family of (t, ǫOW) one-way functions, and G = {gk : {0, 1}
∗ →
{0, 1}ℓ|k ∈ K} be a family of (t, ǫCR) collision-resistant functions.
Then the (n, ℓ) Lamport scheme L(F ,G) is a
(t, r(2 ℓ ǫOW + ǫCR), r)
realization of functionality FSIG1.
Proof. Direct composition of theorems 2.1 with r = 1 and 2.2.
In the UC setting, the signature functionality is a superset of the message authentication
functionality: the ideal functionalities differ only by the possibility for the adversary to query
public keys which exists only for signatures. Therefore a signing scheme can securely be com-
posed with a composable protocol expecting a message authentication scheme, such as a QKD
scheme having universal security as defined in [BoLM05]. This is formalized in the result below.
Theorem 2.3 (Composition result for QKD and FSIG1 signatures). Assume that a QKD pro-
tocol A paired with classical authentic channels satisfies the composable security property
1
2
∥
∥ρASE − ρU ⊗ ρ
A
E
∥
∥
1
< ǫ
where ρSE represents the joint quantum state of an attacker and the final secret key, ρU is the
fully mixed state in the Hilbert space corresponding to the key space, and ρE the attacker state.
Then:
1. Assume protocol parties have access to an unauthenticated communication channel in
addition to an authenticated channel. Then the protocol can be transformed into a protocol
where the authenticated channel is used to transmit only one message in each direction,
with no security loss, i.e. one still has for the transformed protocol
1
2
∥
∥ρASE − ρU ⊗ ρ
A
E
∥
∥
1
< ǫ
2. If this transformed protocol is composed with a (t, ǫ′, 2) realization of functionality FSIG1
to authenticate the two exchanged messages, where any adversary running in time ≤ t
can distinguish between the ideal functionality and the realization with probability ≤ ǫ′,
the resulting protocol B is ǫ+ ǫ′-secure against adversaries running in time ≤ t:
1
2
∥
∥ρBSE − ρU ⊗ ρ
B
E
∥
∥
1
< ǫ+ ǫ′
3. When the FSIG1 functionality is provided by the (n, ℓ) Lamport algorithm instantiated with
a (t, ǫOW) one-way function family and a (t, ǫCR) collision-resistant function family,
1
2
∥∥ρBSE − ρU ⊗ ρ
B
E
∥∥
1
< ǫ+ 4 ℓ ǫOW + 2 ǫCR
Proof. 1. The original protocol is transformed as follows. Each message is sent on the unau-
thenticated channel. When some of the parties of the protocol has finished its execution
and is ready to produce some key, it first builds an unambiguous description of all the
messages exchanged during the protocol run (the ”conversation”). The exact nature of
this description depends on the properties of the authenticated channel used by the un-
modified protocol: for instance, if it guarantees an ordering of the messages sent in both
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directions, the description of the conversation should include that ordering information.
This description is then sent on the authenticated channel. Conversely, each party waits
for the reception of this description from its peer and checks that it matches its own view
of the conversation. If not, the protocol is aborted. If no party aborts, then each message
sent was received unmodified, no message was deleted and the message ordering proper-
ties guaranteed by the authenticated channel model were preserved. Therefore for each
successful execution of the protocol, everything happens as if an authenticated channel
was used and the security property of the unmodified protocol holds.
2. The protocol modified to use the authenticated channel only once in each direction is
composed with functionality FSIG1 to perform the message authentications. Each identity
is only used once therefore the usage of functionality FSIG1 is correct. The result is then
a consequence of the composition theorem for UC protocols.
3. Apply corollary 2.1 with r = 2.
2.4 Parameter Dimensioning
Generic (non quantum) attacks against a hash function producing ℓ-bit hashes enable to find
collisions in O
(
2ℓ/2
)
hash function computations. For a n-bit hash function, preimages are
found in a generic way in O (2n) hash function computations. k-bit classical security (i.e. best
non-quantum attack in O
(
2k
)
operations) for Lamport signatures therefore requires n ≥ k and
ℓ ≥ 2k. Typically we want 128-bit security, which yields n ≥ 128 bits and ℓ ≥ 256 bits.
If quantum generic attacks are taken into account, the picture changes a bit. Finding
preimages of an n-bit hash function can be performed in O
(
2n/2
)
operations using Grover
algorithm, and there is a quantum algorithm with complexity O
(
2ℓ/3
)
able to find with good
probability a collision of ℓ-bit hashes [BHT97]. However it requires a (quantum) memory of
size O
(
2ℓ/3
)
[GR04], so that we rather include its analysis to the next paragraph about parallel
methods. With a constant or log amount of memory, the best known quantum attacks for n-bit
hash preimage and ℓ-bit hash collision have complexity O
(
2n/2
)
and O
(
2ℓ/2
)
, respectively. For
k-bit security, one should therefore choose ℓ, n ≥ 2k.
Assuming some parallelism, results are again different. With a (classical or quantum, com-
putation or memory) resource size of O (2µ), and realistic communication models, the best
known generic preimage complexity for a n-bit hash function is O
(
2(n−µ)/2
)
and the best colli-
sion attack for a ℓ-bit hash function, O
(
2ℓ/2−µ
)
[Ber09]. Hence one should choose n ≥ 2k + µ
and ℓ ≥ 2(k+µ). Assuming k = 128 and µ = 64 (which is an extremely large security margin),
this gives n ≥ 320 bits and ℓ ≥ 384 bits.
The complexities above are given for an attacker with success probability one. Going back
to the ǫ′, ǫ′′ above, the success probability of an attacker using only a fraction η of the resources
indicated has a success probability η2, except for the classical preimage search algorithm where
the probability scales linearly with the effort.
2.5 Operation with a Secure Device
A secure device provides facilities to store data in a confidential and/or authentic way and
to perform operations using this data. A typical cheap secure device is a smart card. It has
a limited computational power, but is designed to store keys securely and enable to operate
some cryptographic algorithms making use of these keys, typically a hashing algorithm (usually
SHA1 or SHA2) and a block cipher algorithm (3DES or AES). More powerful secure devices
9
(’Hardware Security Modules’) can sit in computers but usually offer security assurances lower
than smart cards.
The right way to implement a public-key algorithm such as Lamport is to never let private
keys go out of secure devices. Therefore each secure device, at each end of the QKD link,
generates its own private key and discloses the corresponding public key. During a trusted
initialization phase, each device then receives the public key of the other device, or some digest
of it, enabling it to later authenticate the signature of the other party.
Both the collision-resistant function and the preimage-resistant function are implemented
with the hash function provided by the secure device.
Since the first step in computing a signature (applying g) does not involve the private key,
and results into a small-fixed-length string, this step can be performed outside the secure device.
The hash is then provided to the secure device. With notations of section 2.1, the latter then
picks the values x0[m0], x1[m1], . . . , xℓ−1[mℓ−1] corresponding to the digest m0, . . . , mℓ provided.
To ensure a correct usage of the algorithm as well as to effectively protect the private key,
the sequencing of the instructions to the secure device should prevent multiple signing with the
same private key. For instance, if the values xi[mi] are output successively by the secure device,
as it is the case with a smart card that cannot output the signature all-at-once, the private key
should be erased as soon as the last signature part is output, or even better, xi[1−mi] can be
erased as soon as mi is known by the secure device.
3 Variants
3.1 Reducing the Private and Public Key Size
An issue with the Lamport algorithm is its large key size: for instance, for ℓ = 256 and n = 128,
the public key size is 2×256×128 = 64Kb. With the more conservative parameters of paragraph
2.3, the size becomes 2×384×320 = 240Kb. Such a key cannot be stored on most smart cards.
A standard way to overcome this is to generate the private key from a pseudo-random
number generator (PRNG) and to store only the secret s of the PRNG; it is then possible
to compute the public and the private key on-the-fly. The public key and signature are then
computed and output piece by piece, typically one hash at a time.
Security wise, using this construction requires to take into account the PRNG security.
Definition 3.1 (PRNG security, adapted from [GGM86]). Let k ≤ ℓ ∈ N. A (k, ℓ)-PRNG is
a function h : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}ℓ. A distinguishing adversary A against h plays the following
game. Random values s ∈ {0, 1}k, T ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, and b ∈ {0, 1} are drawn uniformly. A is given
c = h(s) if b = 0, and c = T otherwise; it must guess b. h is a (tRG, ǫRG)-secure PRNG if no
randomized distinguishing adversary running in time ≤ tRG has advantage ǫ = |2×p−1| larger
than ǫRG, where p is its probability to guess b correctly.
The security loss incurred by the use of a PRNG to generate the Lamport private key is
quantified in the result below.
Theorem 3.1 (EU-CMA security of the full Lamport signature scheme with a PRNG-generated
private key). Let n, ℓ ∈ N, F = {fk : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}n|k ∈ K} be a family of (t, ǫOW) one-
way functions, G = {gk : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}ℓ|k ∈ K ′} be a family of (t, ǫCR) collision-resistant
functions, and h a (k, 2n ℓ) (tRG, ǫRG)-secure PRNG. Then the (n, ℓ) Lamport signature scheme
L(F ,G) that uses F , G and h for the private key generation is (t, r(2 ℓ ǫOW + ǫCR + ǫRG), 1, r)
EU-CMA secure.
Proof. Let A be an EU-CMA attacker against a (n, ℓ) Lamport scheme, and running in time
≤ t. Let ǫj be its success probability ia a EU-CMA game where the first j identities are
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created with the PRNG and random seeds, and the others with random private keys. ǫ0 is the
success probability against the unmodified Lamport scheme and there exists i s.t. |ǫi+1− ǫ1| ≥
1/r|ǫr − ǫ1|.
From A, construct an adversary against the PRNG as follows. The private key of the i+1-
th identity created in the EU-CMA game is created from the PRNG challenge that is either
a PRNG output or a random string. For j ≤ i, private keys are created with a PRNG. For
j > i + 1, they are random. Output b′ where b′ = 0 iff A wins the EU-CMA game. Then
Pr(b′ = 0|b = 0) − Pr(b′ = 0|b = 1) = ǫi+1 − ǫi. It can be verified that the advantage of our
attacker against the PRNG is |Pr(b′ = 0|b = 0)− Pr(b′ = 0|b = 1)|. As a consequence,
ǫRG ≥ |ǫi+1 − ǫi| ≥ 1/r|ǫr − ǫ1|.
This, combined with theorem 2.1, gives the final result.
Corollary 3.1 (UC Security of the Lamport Signature Scheme with Private Key generated by
a PRNG). With the same assumptions and notations as theorem 3.1, the Lamport scheme is
for any r ∈ N a
(t, r(2 ℓ ǫOW + ǫCR + ǫRG), r)
realization of functionality FSIG1.
Proof. Direct composition of theorems 3.1 with r = 1 and 2.2.
The generic brute-force attack against a PRNG enumerates all seeds s and outputs b = 0
if and only if a seed s such that h(s) = c exists. This algorithm runs in time O
(
2k
)
and wins
with advantage ≥ 1 − 2k−ℓ. This is similar to the preimage attacks we discussed in paragraph
2.4, and the bounds given there for n apply for the size k of s. Secure PRNG constructions
from secure hashing primitives and satisfying these size constraints exist (see for instance the
annex of [FIP09]).
3.2 Enabling Multiple Signatures: Merkle trees
Lamport signatures, or, for the matter, any one-time signature (OTS) scheme, can be paired
withMerkle trees, which are a construction using only preimage-resistant functions and enabling
the authentication of a large family of public signature keys with only one short value. We
omit a complete description of Merkle trees, which is detailed for instance in [BBD08], but only
describe their role and associated cost.
A Merkle tree of depth H uses a collision-resistant function T : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}m, and
enables to perform 2H signatures. The tree ’public key’ is a m-bit value.
Each message signature consists in a public key and a signature by the underlying one-time
signature scheme, with some added information value enabling to authenticate the OTS public
key. This added information consists in H m-bit values. The signature verification, aside from
the underlying OTS signature verification, requires H computations of m.
The signature algorithm calls the underlying OTS algorithm once and requires additionally
O (H) computations of T and the storage of O (H) values of T .
Initially, 2H OTS public-private key pairs must be generated. This is usually too large
to store; instead, a PRNG can be used, with ideas similar to those of paragraph 3.1. The
computation of the tree public key requires 2H−1 computations of T and uses the 2H underlying
OTS public keys, which are themselves computed in the case of the Lamport algorithm through
2H+ℓ+1 calls to f .
The success probability of an attacker against this scheme in the EF-CMA model, attempt-
ing to forge a signature after requesting at most 2H signatures, is bounded by 2HǫOTS + ǫCR
where ǫOTS is the success probability of an attacker against the underlying OTS scheme, and
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ǫCR the success probability of an attacker against the collision resistance of T . The output size
t of T should therefore be chosen as ℓ for the Lamport signature scheme. For a proof of this
result and more discussion on the attackers running times, see theorem 8.2 of [BBD08].
In the UC sense, there is a similar result:
Theorem 3.2 (UC security of one-time signatures combined with Merkle trees construct).
The combination of a (t, ǫOTS, 1) realization of functionality FSIG1, and of the Merkle tree
construction of depth H using a (t, ǫCR′) collision-resistant function family is for any r,H ∈ N
a (t, r(2H ǫOTS + ǫCR′), r) realization of functionality FSIG2H .
Proof. EU-CMA security is proved as in theorem 2.1: one first guesses the identity for which
the forgery will occur, then a challenge for the underlying OTS scheme is injected in one of
the 2H OTS public keys of this identity; if the guess is right, a correct answer of an EU-CMA
attacker against the composition of the OTS scheme and Merkle tree construct produces a
correct answer for the underlying OTS challenge with probability 2−H , or a collision on T .
Then theorem 2.2 is applied with r = 1.
Theorem 3.3 (UC security of Lamport signatures Combined with Merkle Trees Construct).
The combination of the Lamport scheme with the hypotheses of theorem 2.1 and of Merkle trees
of depth H built with a (t, ǫCR′) collision-resistant function family is a (t, r
[
2H(2 ℓ ǫOW + ǫCR) + ǫCR’
]
, r)
realization of functionality FSIG2H .
Proof. Composition of theorems 2.1 with r = 1 and 3.2.
For the sake of completeness, let us formulate a result for the combination of Lamport
Signatures and Merkles trees, when the 2H Lamport private keys for each identity of the
Lamport scheme are generated from one single seed using a PRNG.
Theorem 3.4 (UC security of Lamport signatures combined with Merkle trees and PRNG).
Let m,n, ℓ,H ∈ N and
• F = {fk : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}n|k ∈ K} be a (t, ǫOW) one-way function family,
• G = {gk : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}ℓ|k ∈ K ′} be a (t, ǫCR) collision-resistant function family,
• T = {Tk : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}m|k ∈ K ′′} be a (t, ǫCR’) collision-resistant function family,
• h a (k, 2H(2n ℓ)) (tRG, ǫRG)-secure PRNG.
Then the combination of the (n, ℓ) Lamport signature scheme that uses F , G with depth H
Merkle trees, where each private key of the combination is generated with h from a random
seed, is a
(t, r
[
2H(2 ℓ ǫOW + ǫRG + ǫCR) + ǫCR’
]
, r)
realization of functionality FSIG2H .
Proof. As the proof of theorem 3.1, starting from the EU-CMA security of the combination of
the Lamport algorithm and Merkle trees.
In the usage context of quantum key distribution, the typical instantiation of Merkle trees
would use a rather small parameter H (say H < 10) to avoid sending a new public key in each
signature, while retaining a small signature and verification overhead (this is especially true on
the verification side where the Lamport verification alone requires ℓ hash computations). This
also ensures the provable security loss factor incurred, 2H , is small.
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4 Conclusion
We have seen that provided some minimal hypotheses are fulfilled, namely the existence of
preimage-resistant and collision-resistant functions, some signatures schemes well known in
classical cryptography can be securely composed with a QKD protocol to authenticate commu-
nications on a classical channel without a common secret, and thereby enable to bootstrap key
production on a quantum key distribution link. In practical scenarios, collision-resistant and
preimage-resistant functions are instantiated with a cryptographic hash function. We contend
that the security gained by the removal of the initial common secret far outweights the loss
caused by the dependence to the preimage and collision resistance of the hash function used,
notably because these properties are required to hold only until the initial QKD protocol run
finishes, and not as long as the keys produced by the QKD link are supposed to remain secret.
We believe that there are other ways to use properties related to one-wayness, like pseudo-
randomness, to improve the practicality and/or security of QKD protocols, without sacrificing
its most fundamental property, the forward secrecy.
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